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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

30 September 1981

MEMORANDUM	
Nicaraguan Support for Central American Revolutionaries	25X1
The Sandinistas remain fully committed to supporting the	25X1
Salvadoran insurgents.	25X1
Nicaragua is infil-	2321
trating arms into El Salvador by land, sea, and air. Because of interdiction efforts by Honduran authorities, the Sandinistas are	
again emphasizing air deliveries over land shipments. Neverthe-	
less, while the ongoing supply effort appears to be sufficient to	
sustain the current relatively low level of guerrilla activity,	
we believe it would have to be increased significantly to support	
a major insurgent offensive.	25X1
	25X
	25X
addition, Nicaragua is sending small numbers of military advisers	
to El Salvador. The Sandinistas also continue to support leftist	25X1
extremists in Honduras and Guatemala.	2321
El Salvador	
The Sandinistas are convinced that a leftist victory in El	
Salvador is essential to the security of their own regime and probably doubt that the US would resume economic assistance to Nicaragua even if they halted their support activities.	25X1 25X1
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nothing Washington can say or do will induce the Sandinistas to cease their assistance to the Salvadoran	25 X 1
guerrillas.	
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	25X1
Three Salvadoran insurgent groups	25X1
operate separate arms-distribution networks in	25X1
Honduras. These networks maintain caches of weapons infiltrated from Nicaragua and later transfer them to El Salvador	
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a growing proportion of	25X1
arms deliveries are now being made by air, due in part to the	20/(1
success of Honduran authorities in intercepting land shipments.	25X1
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	05144
weapons continue to depart	<u>2</u> 5 × 1

2 SECRET SPOKE

Cuba and the USSR have supplied most of the weapons smuggled to the Salvadoran revolutionaries, but Libya apparently is taking	_
a larger role.	25X1
In addition to channeling arms to El Salvador, the Sandinistas are now sending advisers.	0574
	25X1
Other Activities	
Managua also is continuing its assistance to leftists in	
Honduras.	25X1
Managua continues to provide small amounts of arms and other assistance to Guatemalan insurgents revolutionaries	0574
from various Central American countries continue to receive paramilitary training in Nicaragua.	25X1
	25X1

3 SECRET SPOKE